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Abstract. This paper focuses on ex post governance of inter-ﬁrm transactions. We develop
and test hypotheses on the occurrence of ex post problems like delivery delays, inferior quality,
and insuﬃcient service in buyer–supplier transactions. Our hypotheses address eﬀects of
transaction characteristics, of social embeddedness, and of contractual governance on the
occurrence of problems. Other than earlier research on embeddedness eﬀects in this ﬁeld, we
consider not only eﬀects of dyadic embeddedness but also eﬀects of network embeddedness.
We test hypotheses using rich survey data on more than 1200 purchases of information
technology (IT) products: hardware and software, both standard and complex. We ﬁnd
evidence for eﬀects of transaction characteristics on the occurrence of problems, while our
data do not support hypotheses on eﬀects of contractual governance. Our data provide rather
consistent support for hypotheses on the eﬀects of embeddedness. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd
evidence that network embeddedness reduces problems.
Key words: buyer–supplier relations, embeddedness, ex post problems, inter-ﬁrm networks,
governance, transaction cost theory
1. Introduction
This paper contributes to expanding the study of governance from ex ante
features such as contracting to ex post features of contract execution. More
speciﬁcally, we study the occurrence of ex post problems in buyer–supplier
transactions. We thus analyze outcomes of purchasing. The importance of
purchasing has grown considerably. Firms focus on core competences and
consequently outsource more components. For instance, in the automotive
and electronic industries, typically between 60 and 80% of the product value
has been outsourced to suppliers (Schary and Skjøtt-Larsen, 2001). Also,
ﬁrms face an increasing pressure to innovate, and suppliers are considered to
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be critical sources of innovative product and process technology (Leiblein
et al., 2002). Suppliers and their performance in terms of price, delivery, and
quality are therefore critically important for buying ﬁrms (Leenders and
Fearon, 1993).
Purchasing can be precarious in the sense that problems occur during and
after the transaction. We focus on problems for buyers such as delivery
delays, delivery of inferior quality, and insuﬃcient service by the supplier. We
study how the occurrence of problems depends on characteristics of the
transaction, on the embeddedness of the transaction in ongoing relations of
buyer and supplier, and on contract characteristics.
Empirical studies employing a similar perspective are scarce (Wathne and
Heide, 2000; Jap and Anderson, 2003; David and Han, 2004). Available
evidence often derives from studies on performance. This is not surprising,
since performance can be conceived as a result of problems prevented or
cured. Typically, earlier studies focus on performance of relations rather than
transactions between buyers and suppliers (see Kogut, 1989; Parkhe, 1993 for
examples of related work on performance of strategic alliances and joint
ventures). Noordewier et al. (1990) examine purchasing performance in
industrial purchasing relationships. Performance indicators are the percent-
age of on-time delivery and the percentage of acceptable items delivered.
They ﬁnd that under market uncertainty supplier performance is better if the
supplier is more ﬂexible and provides more assistance. However, supplier
ﬂexibility does not aﬀect performance if there is no market uncertainty.
Heide and Stump (1995) study performance in buyer–supplier relationships
in industrial markets. They measure performance as delivery performance
and adherence to speciﬁcations. They ﬁnd that, given suﬃcient environ-
mental uncertainty, supplier performance is better if buyer and supplier
expect future business. If there is no or hardly any environmental uncer-
tainty, expectations of future business do not matter.
Noordewier et al. (1990) as well as Heide and Stump (1995) use the
occurrence of problems as indicators for (lack of) performance. Other studies
relate performance not only to the occurrence or, respectively, prevention of
problems, but also to their cure. For example, Poppo and Zenger (2002)
study outsourcing relationships in information services. Supplier perfor-
mance is measured as the buyer’s overall satisfaction with the service. Their
ﬁndings suggest that relational governance in combination with customized
contracts improves performance. In another study on supplier performance,
Kotabe et al. (2003) focus on supplier performance improvement, measured
as the degree to which the buyer is able to improve own product and process
design, product quality, and lead time through the relation with the supplier.
They ask how relationship duration moderates the eﬀects of knowledge
transfer between buyer and supplier on supplier performance improvement.
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They ﬁnd that increasing relationship duration enhances the positive per-
formance eﬀects of complex technology transfer but not the performance
eﬀects of ordinary technical exchanges. Jap and Anderson (2003) investigate
how relationship safeguards function to preserve performance in business-
to-business supply relationships. Performance is measured as the overall
performance (success) of the relationship, the achievement of competitive
advantages, joint proﬁt performance, and expectations of relationship con-
tinuity. They ﬁnd that given a low level of opportunism in the relationship,
bilateral idiosyncratic investments and interpersonal trust enhance perfor-
mance. At higher levels of opportunism, goal congruence is more eﬀective in
enhancing performance. Finally, Claro et al. (2003) study business relation-
ships of suppliers and merchant distributors. While they focus on determi-
nants of relational governance, they also address performance implications of
relational governance. They ﬁnd that relational governance indicators such
as joint planning and joint problem solving are associated with higher sales
growth as a performance measure, but joint planning, in contrast to joint
problem solving, does not lead to improved performance in the sense of
higher satisfaction with outcomes of the relationship.
Our study improves on earlier research in two ways. First, from a theo-
retical and substantive perspective, a major new feature of our study is that
our embeddedness characteristics include network embeddedness. We con-
sider network embeddedness in the sense of ties of the buyer with other
buyers of the supplier. Moreover, we analyze eﬀects of network embedded-
ness in the sense of access to alternative suppliers. Our data include multiple
indicators for both types of network embeddedness. Earlier research on
problems and performance in buyer–supplier relations was restricted to
eﬀects of dyadic embeddedness in the sense of (characteristics of) the previous
relation between buyer and supplier or expected future transactions between
buyer and supplier. Gierl and Bambauer (2002) is, in a sense, an exception.
However, rather than analyzing problems that occur for the buyer, their
study is on how network embeddedness aﬀects problems that occur for the
supplier through buyer opportunism. Also, our data comprise more detailed
measurements of network embeddedness. Incorporating eﬀects of network
embeddedness on the occurrence of problems during and after a transaction
complements studies on network eﬀects on ex ante governance such as the
buyer’s search for and selection of a supplier (e.g., Buskens et al., 2003) and
network eﬀects on contracting (e.g., Gulati, 1995; Rooks et al., 2000).
Second, from a methodological perspective, we improve on earlier
research by implementing a core element of the research program of trans-
action cost economics, namely, to use the transaction as the basic unit of
analysis (see, e.g., Williamson, 1985: chaps. 1 and 15; 1996: chap. 9). Our
literature overview indicates that earlier research on ex post features of
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governance such as the occurrence of problems and performance focuses on
inter-ﬁrm relations rather than transactions: Problems and performance are
typically measured at the level of the relation rather than the transaction
itself. We do measure problems that occur in a focal transaction. We are
therefore able to disentangle the level of the transaction, the level of the
relation between buyer and supplier, and the level of the network of buyer
and supplier with third parties. Moreover, we use a ﬁne-grained measure of
the occurrence of problems during and after the transaction. This measure is
based on a detailed list of 11 typical problems often associated with the
transactions included in our sample. For each transaction, a key informant
assessed the degree to which each of these problems occurred.
In the remainder of this paper, we ﬁrst develop a theoretical framework
and derive hypotheses on the eﬀects of transaction characteristics, embedd-
edness, and contractual governance on the occurrence of problems during
and after a transaction. We then describe the data collection and variable
construction. In the results section, we present outcomes of a three-stage least
squares regression analysis for testing our hypotheses. A discussion and
concluding remarks follow.
2. Theory and hypotheses
We explain the occurrence of problems during and after a focal transaction
using two approaches from economics and sociology that yield hypotheses on
how three groups of variables aﬀect the occurrence of problems: transaction
characteristics, embeddedness characteristics, and contractual ex ante gov-
ernance. One approach is transaction cost theory (see Williamson, 1985 as a
major contribution). Using this theory, we derive hypotheses on how trans-
action characteristics, namely, transaction-speciﬁc investments and behav-
ioral uncertainty surrounding a transaction, and contractual ex ante
governance aﬀect ex post problems during contract execution.
Sociologists (see the inﬂuential programmatic statement in Granovetter,
1985) argue that transaction cost theory largely abstracts from the
embeddedness of economic transactions. Transactions, however, are typically
not isolated events. Rather, they are often embedded in an ongoing relation
of repeated exchange between buyer and supplier. Transactions are also
embedded in relations of buyer and supplier with third parties. For example,
the buyer has access to and exchanges information with other clients of the
supplier or the buyer has access to alternative suppliers. Embeddedness
allows for non-contractual governance. Classical sociology (Durkheim, 1893:
Book I, chap. 7; Weber, 1921: 409), the sociology of law (see Macaulay’s
seminal 1963 study and the ‘‘law and society’’ approach building on
Macaulay’s work), and more recently the new economic sociology (see
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Smelser and Swedberg, 2005 for a representative overview) have provided
arguments that can be used to generate hypotheses on how problems during
and after a transaction depend on embeddedness.
We ﬁrst outline how we use both approaches in our analysis and how
these approaches relate to one another. We then derive our hypotheses.
2.1. TRANSACTION CHARACTERISTICS, EMBEDDEDNESS, GOVERNANCE, AND
EX POST PROBLEMS
Our analysis aims at explaining the occurrence of problems during and after
the execution of purchasing transactions. We focus on problems experienced
by the buyer rather than problems experienced by the supplier. Thus,
problems we address include delivery delays, delivery of inferior quality, and
insuﬃcient service by the supplier rather than, say, delayed payment by the
buyer. Problems during and after a transaction result from the risks associ-
ated with the transaction. These risks include opportunistic behavior, deﬁned
by Williamson (1985: 47) as ‘‘self-interest seeking with guile.’’ An example is
a delivery delay because the supplier serves another client ﬁrst, thus violating
an earlier and possibly implicit agreement with the buyer on delivery dead-
lines. Other risks are coordination problems, incompetence of the supplier, or
unfavorable external contingencies. Firms manage risks and try to safeguard
their transactions through governance. An example of a safeguard is a
written contract. Other safeguards are non-contractual and include,
e.g., rules and norms of informal reciprocity and conditional cooperation.
Protecting transactions by means of contracts is costly. Eliminating risks
completely through contracting is thus typically ineﬃcient, if at all feasible.
Likewise, even if informal reciprocity and conditional cooperation guide the
behavior of the partners and mitigate opportunism, problems may emerge.
For example, unfavorable external contingencies rather than opportunistic
behavior of the supplier can cause a delivery delay. Consequently, gover-
nance will not preclude the occurrence of problems during and after a
transaction.
2.1.1. Transaction cost theory
The focus of transaction cost theory is on explaining ex ante contractual
governance, broadly conceived, as well as on ex post problems and perfor-
mance eﬀects of contractual governance (e.g., Williamson, 1985, 1996). On
the one hand, transaction cost theory asks how transaction characteristics –
such as speciﬁc investments and uncertainty associated with a transaction –
aﬀect contracting. Roughly, the idea is that transaction characteristics aﬀect
the risks associated with a transaction. Contractual governance refers to
ex ante measures that actors involved in an exchange use or implement in
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order to mitigate risks and therefore also to improve performance. Trans-
action cost theory tries to explain ex ante governance based on the
assumption that governance is subject to economizing behavior of exchange
partners.
On the other hand, transaction cost theory is not at all blind for ex post
performance eﬀects of ex ante contractual governance (e.g., Williamson, 2001
argues that an explicit focus on ex post governance is a core advantage of
transaction cost theory compared to the property rights approach). Theo-
retically, an underlying assumption is that contractual governance aﬀects
performance in the sense that exchange partners respond systematically to
the incentives provided by contractual governance. Furthermore, transaction
cost theory assumes that exchange partners anticipate on these responses
when designing contracts (see Prendergast, 1999 for the same argument in
another context: the design of compensation contracts by employers to align
the interests of employees). More technically (e.g., Williamson, 1985: 20–22),
transaction cost theory assumes that both ex ante transaction costs of
drafting, negotiating, and safeguarding agreements as well as ex post trans-
action costs such as costs of maladaption, haggling, and of enforcing
agreements are subject to economizing.
Since contractual governance is costly, economizing on transaction
costs will typically not eliminate all risks associated with the transaction so
that problems are likely to occur during and after the execution of a
transaction. Summarizing, based on transaction cost theory we assume
that transaction characteristics aﬀect ex post problems directly, for
example, through incentive eﬀects for suppliers, as well as indirectly
through eﬀects on ex ante contractual governance that anticipates on ex
post performance eﬀects.
To put our own empirical analysis in perspective, it is useful to note that
there are empirical applications of transaction cost theory that focus on ex
post features of governance. Our overview of empirical studies on perfor-
mance in buyer–supplier relations includes such work. Other inﬂuential
empirical work includes the study of strategic alliances and joint ventures
(e.g., Kogut, 1989; Parkhe, 1993) as well as subcontracting (e.g., Lorenz,
1988). However, the bulk of empirical applications of transaction cost
theory and tests of hypotheses derived from the theory addresses ex ante
governance (see the overview by Shelanski and Klein, 1999, edited volumes
such as Masten, 1996a, and particularly the survey by David and Han, 2004
that aims at a systematic quantitative assessment of the available empirical
evidence for and against transaction cost theory arguments). Thus, ana-
lyzing ex post problems in buyer–supplier transactions potentially has a
relatively strong eﬀect on the ‘evidence/theory ratio’ (David and Han, 2004:
52–53).
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2.1.2. Governance
Our analysis uses transaction cost theory arguments but likewise tries to reﬁne
and expand these arguments. First, transaction cost theory often focuses on
markets and hierarchies as polar modes of governance, with ‘‘hybrids’’
(‘‘franchising, joint ventures, and other forms of nonstandard contracting’’
according to Williamson 1985: 83) located in between. It has been argued
(Grandori, 1997) that a more ﬁne-grained perspective will often be preferable
that accounts for the fact that the standard discrete alternative governance
structures of transaction cost theory are actually conﬁgurations of more basic
mechanisms. Also, one should not overlook non-contractual governance
through, e.g., rules and norms of informal reciprocity and conditional
cooperation. We implement a more ﬁne-grained perspective on governance in
the sense that we analyze exclusively purchase transactions. Hence, we do not
analyze the make-or-buy decision but focus on market transactions. However,
these transactions do not occur on ideal-typical perfect markets with price
signals as a suﬃcient statistic. Rather, the governance of these transactions
diﬀers in the amount of eﬀort invested in as well as in the completeness
of contractual ex ante planning. Moreover, we take into account that the
governance of these transactions can involve non-contractual elements.
2.1.3. Embeddedness of transactions
We develop hypotheses on embeddedness eﬀects based on a distinction
between dyadic embeddedness and network embeddedness on the one hand
and learning and control eﬀects through embeddedness on the other hand
(see Buskens and Raub, 2002 for details). Dyadic embeddedness refers to an
ongoing relation between exchange partners (note that dyadic embeddedness
thus diﬀers from Williamson’s frequency dimension that refers strictly to
buyer activity in the market rather than repeated transactions between the
same partners; Williamson, 1985: 72). Network embeddedness refers to their
relations with third parties. We thus employ a notion of structural em-
beddedness that focuses on the quality and structure of ties among actors
(Granovetter, 1985; Zukin and DiMaggio, 1990).
Embeddedness provides opportunities for learning about the partner and
about the risks associated with a focal transaction, such as the risk of supplier
incompetence and the supplier’s inclination to opportunistic behavior. Dyadic
embeddedness allows for learning through own previous experience with the
partner. Network embeddedness provides opportunities for learning through
information on previous experiences of third parties. Embeddedness also
allows for control of the partner in the sense of opportunities for future
rewards (positive sanctions) as well as future punishments (negative sanctions)
of the partner’s present behavior in a focal transaction. Good supplier
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performance in a focal transaction can be rewarded and bad performance can
be punished through the buyer’s own behavior in future transactions with the
supplier (control through dyadic embeddedness) as well as through involving
third parties, for example, by informing other buyers on the supplier’s per-
formance in the focal transaction (control through network embeddedness).
Embeddedness thus provides opportunities for ‘‘informal,’’ non-contractual
governance based on various forms of reciprocity and conditional coopera-
tion, thus deterring opportunistic behavior (Axelrod, 1984; Taylor, 1987).
Summarizing, embeddedness characteristics will aﬀect the risks associated
with a transaction, how exchange partners economize on costly contractual
governance, and will thus aﬀect problems that occur during and after the
transaction.
2.1.4. Summarizing the underlying theoretical argument
Figure 1 summarizes the basic logic of our argument. The Figure shows that
governance has to be conceived as endogenous in our empirical analyses. Our
hypotheses exclusively address direct eﬀects of transaction characteristics as
well as embeddedness on problems during and after a focal transaction.
We do not develop hypotheses on the sum of the direct and indirect eﬀects
– through governance – of transaction characteristics and, respectively,
embeddedness on ex post problems. However, in our empirical analysis we
take the endogeneity of governance characteristics explicitly into account.
Also, we focus in this paper on main eﬀects of transaction characteristics, of
embeddedness features, and of governance characteristics. We do not aim at
deriving more complex hypotheses on interaction eﬀects but control for
possible interaction eﬀects in exploratory regression diagnostics. Our
hypotheses on governance eﬀects exclusively address eﬀects of contractual
governance. However, in an exploratory analysis we compare the eﬀect of
contractual governance with the direct and indirect eﬀects of embeddedness
allowing for non-contractual governance. Obviously, our hypotheses tacitly
include a ceteris paribus clause and are meant to specify eﬀects we expect to
hold while controlling for other variables in the statistical analysis.
We conceptualize transaction characteristics and embeddedness charac-





Figure 1. Types of hypothesized relations between variables.
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example, buyers could choose between purchasing a standard and a tailor-
made product and could thus choose between transaction characteristics.
Such choices could indeed be analyzed as an ingredient of ex ante gover-
nance. In this paper, following standard versions of transaction cost theory
(e.g., Williamson, 1985: chaps. 1–3), we abstract from this complication.
Likewise, embeddedness characteristics need not be given. Rather, they often
are – at least to some degree – choice variables: ﬁrms could establish or delete
ties with other ﬁrms with an eye on the performance eﬀects of such ties. Also,
embeddedness characteristics can aﬀect transaction characteristics. For
example, after a trial period of less risky transactions and good experiences in
that period, a buyer engages in more risky transactions with a supplier (e.g.,
Larson, 1992; Helper, 1993; Uzzi, 1996). Analyzing such eﬀects is, however,
beyond the scope of this paper.
2.1.5. Behavioral assumptions underlying transaction cost theory and
embeddedness arguments
The relation between transaction cost theory and embeddedness arguments is
a debated issue. One may not only argue (see above) that transaction char-
acteristics depend – at least to some degree – on embeddedness. On a more
fundamental level, it is sometimes claimed (e.g., Uzzi, 1996, 1997) that re-
search on embeddedness eﬀects yields ﬁndings that are hard to reconcile with
assumptions on incentive-guided and basically selﬁsh behavior that are used
as the underlying behavioral model in transaction cost theory.
In this contribution, we circumvent this issue (seeGrandori, 2000 for amore
detailed discussion of behavioral models underlying analyses of governance).
We do so by focusing on hypotheses on embeddedness eﬀects that can indeed
be derived using behavioral assumptions like those employed in transaction
cost theory. Perhaps surprisingly, this is in line with Granovetter’s (1985: 505–
506) often cited programmatic sketch of an embeddedness approach to eco-
nomic life. Granovetter’s criticism of the shortcomings of the neoclassical
model of perfect markets of ‘‘atomized’’ actors and transactions has often been
taken to imply that one had better abandon models of incentive-guided and
selﬁsh behavior in favor of more ‘‘realistic,’’ socially inspiredmodels of man. It
has been widely overlooked that Granovetter opposes ‘‘psychological revi-
sionism’’ which he characterizes as ‘‘an attempt to reform economic theory by
abandoning an absolute assumption of rational decision making’’ (1985: 505).
Rather, he suggests to maintain the rationality assumption: ‘‘[W]hile the
assumption of rational actionmust always be problematic, it is a goodworking
hypothesis that should not easily be abandoned.What looks to the analyst like
nonrational behavior may be quite sensible when situational constraints,
especially those of embeddedness are fully appreciated’’ (1985: 506). He argues
that investments in tracing the eﬀects of embeddedness are more promising
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than investments in the modiﬁcation of the rationality assumption: ‘‘My claim
is that however naive that psychology [of rational choice] may be, this is not
where the main diﬃculty lies – it is rather in the neglect of social structure’’
(1985: 628). It is thus not surprising that Williamson (e.g., 1996: 230–231) has
accentuated the complementarities between transaction cost theory and
arguments based on embeddedness.
We likewise maintain that an appropriate way of accounting for many
eﬀects of embeddedness is to derive hypotheses on such eﬀects from
assumptions on incentive-guided and selﬁsh behavior in a context that diﬀers
from the neoclassical model of perfect markets in that transactions are
embedded in ongoing relations and networks of exchange partners. We now
proceed with presenting our hypotheses.
2.2. HYPOTHESES ON EFFECTS OF TRANSACTION CHARACTERISTICS
We distinguish two core transaction characteristics that are expected to have
an eﬀect on the occurrence of ex post problems in the focal transaction,
namely, transaction-speciﬁc investments of the buyer as well as behavioral
uncertainty of the buyer (see Williamson, 1985: chap. 3 for hypotheses on
eﬀects of these transaction characteristics on ex ante governance).
2.2.1. Speciﬁc investments
A core argument of transaction cost theory holds that when ﬁrms make uni-
lateral investments that are speciﬁc to a transaction or relation, the hazard of
opportunistic behavior of the partner increases. Given speciﬁc investments of
buyers, they face switching costs – we will use measurements of such costs as
indicators for speciﬁc investments – when exiting from the relation with a focal
supplier. Consequently, even if the performance of the focal supplier is below
standard, switching to an alternative suppliermay not be a sensible thing to do.
Therefore, switching costs related to speciﬁc investments induce incentives for
supplier opportunism. While transaction cost theory predicts that unilateral
speciﬁc investments of the buyer will induce investments in contractual ex ante
governance to mitigate supplier opportunism, the direct eﬀect of such speciﬁc
investments on the occurrence of ex post problems will be positive.
Hypothesis 1: Transaction-speciﬁc investments of the buyer will be positively
related to the occurrence of ex post problems.
2.2.2. Behavioral uncertainty
Uncertainty refers to diﬃculties of the buyer in observing or predic-
ting contingencies relevant for the transaction. Williamson (1985: 56–59)
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distinguishes market uncertainty that refers to unforeseen or unforeseeable
external contingencies such as technological developments from ‘‘strategic’’
behavioral uncertainty, that is a result of information asymmetry between
buyer and supplier. Here, we focus on the case such that the buyer does not
have access to some private information of the supplier that can be used for
strategic purposes. This is the case of supplier uncertainty in the sense of
Sutcliﬀe and Zaheer (1998: 4): ‘‘[T]he behavioral uncertainty arising from the
(strategic) actions of the exchange partner ﬁrm.’’ We use monitoring prob-
lems of the buyer as an indicator for the buyer’s behavioral uncertainty.
Buyers face monitoring problems if they cannot easily assess, before and at
the time of delivery, the quality of the product or service to be purchased.
Note that such monitoring problems are clearly distinguished from ex post
problems during contract execution such as delivery delays, compatibility
problems, or inadequate service. Monitoring problems of the buyer imply
that coordination between buyer and supplier becomes an issue. Moreover, a
supplier can proﬁt opportunistically from such monitoring problems, for
example by delivering a product of inferior quality. Again, while transaction
cost theory argues that behavioral uncertainty will aﬀect contractual ex ante
governance, we focus on the direct eﬀect on the occurrence of ex post
problems.
Hypothesis 2: Behavioral uncertainty of the buyer will be positively related to
the occurrence of ex post problems.
2.3. HYPOTHESES ON EFFECTS OF EMBEDDEDNESS
Employing the distinction between dyadic embeddedness and network
embeddedness and focusing on learning and control as mechanisms that
become available through embeddedness, we generate hypotheses on
embeddedness eﬀects on the occurrence of ex post problems.
2.3.1. Dyadic embeddedness: previous business
Dyadic embeddedness includes previous as well as expected future transac-
tions between buyer and supplier. Consider ﬁrst the likely relation of previous
transactions between buyer and supplier with supplier performance in the
focal transaction. We focus on the satisfaction of the buyer with previous
transactions with the supplier and relate buyer satisfaction to information
eﬀects and learning from previous business (Granovetter, 1985; Gulati, 1995;
Lorenz, 1988). It is plausible to assume that suppliers who are more com-
petent and less prone to opportunistic behavior will have performed better so
that previous transactions with such suppliers have been associated with
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fewer and less serious ex post problems. This will likely increase buyer sat-
isfaction with previous transactions. Hence, we expect less ex post problems
in the focal transaction the more satisﬁed the buyer has been in previous
transactions with the supplier.
Hypothesis 3: Buyer satisfaction in previous transactions with the supplier will
be negatively related to the occurrence of ex post problems.
2.3.2. Dyadic embeddedness: expected future business
According to a meanwhile common argument, joint expectations of future
business provide opportunities for reciprocity and imply that ﬁrms can
cooperate conditionally (Axelrod, 1984; Taylor, 1987) – control through
dyadic embeddedness. If the supplier performs well in the focal transaction,
the buyer can reward this during future transactions, for example, by
accepting an occasional delivery of somewhat lesser quality in a future
transaction. Conversely, the buyer can punish inferior supplier performance
in the focal transaction in the future, for example, by not accepting deliveries
of somewhat lesser quality in the future, but returning them immediately.
Hence, short-term incentives for a supplier to behave opportunistically in the
focal transaction are balanced by long-term costs of opportunism and by
long-term beneﬁts of cooperative behavior and good performance. We thus
predict a direct eﬀect of expected future business on the occurrence of ex post
problems in the focal transaction.
Hypothesis 4: Expected future business between buyer and supplier will be
negatively related to the occurrence of ex post problems.
2.3.3. Network embeddedness
Transactions can be not only embedded in the dyadic relation between buyer
and supplier but are often also embedded in a network of relations of buyer
and supplier with third parties. We distinguish two diﬀerent networks: the
‘‘voice network’’ and the ‘‘exit network’’ (Blumberg, 2001; Hirschman, 1970;
Rooks et al., 2000). The buyer’s voice network includes other buyers with
whom the buyer can exchange information about the supplier. Their voice
network enables buyers to collect information and learn about the supplier as
well as to spread themselves information about the supplier to other business
partners of the supplier (Kreps, 1990; Raub and Weesie, 1990). If buyers base
their decision to engage in business with a supplier on the supplier’s repu-
tation, this reputation becomes a valuable asset for the supplier. One
mechanism through which the voice network aﬀects the occurrence of ex post
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problems is thus learning and supplier selection based on learning. If a buyer
receives information from many third parties like other buyers about the
supplier and chooses to do business with the supplier, it is plausible that the
information the buyer receives about the supplier is positive in the sense that
it indicates that the supplier is, at least compared to other potential suppliers,
competent and less prone to opportunistic behavior. Hence, ex post problems
are less likely to occur in the focal transaction with that supplier.
Another mechanism works through control and additional opportunities
of the buyer to reward good performance of the supplier in the future as well
as to sanction bad performance. If buyers have access to many other buyers of
the supplier and can thus aﬀect themselves the supplier’s reputation, they can
reward good supplier performance, for example, by recommending the sup-
plier to other buyers. Conversely, bad performance can be sanctioned nega-
tively by warning other buyers and thus spoiling the supplier’s reputation.
Assuming that the supplier is – at least to some degree – aware of the buyer’s
voice network, this reduces the supplier’s temptation for opportunistic
behavior through increased long-term beneﬁts of abstaining from opportun-
ism as well as through increased long-term costs of opportunism. Thus,
through learning as well as through control, we expect a direct eﬀect of the
voice network on the occurrence of ex post problems in the focal transaction.
Hypothesis 5: The size of the voice network will be negatively related to the
occurrence of ex post problems.
The exit network refers to the buyer’s opportunities for purchasing the
product or service from an alternative supplier. A larger exit network facil-
itates switching suppliers. Hence, the buyer becomes less dependent on the
supplier and can more easily control the supplier by rewarding good per-
formance in the focal transaction through future business with the supplier
and threatening bad performance in the focal transaction with abstaining
from future business with the supplier. Again, assuming (some) awareness of
the supplier with respect to the buyer’s exit network, this reduces the sup-
plier’s incentives for opportunism and is thus expected to aﬀect the occur-
rence of ex post problems in the focal transaction.
Hypothesis 6: The size of the exit network will be negatively related to the
occurrence of ex post problems.
2.4. HYPOTHESES ON EFFECTS OF CONTRACTUAL GOVERNANCE
Macaulay (1963) characterized contracts as a means of planning a trans-
action, including speciﬁcations of what has to happen under certain
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contingencies, and as a means of specifying sanctions that help induce parties
to perform. Contractual governance of a transaction may thus reduce
problems and increase supplier performance, while contractual governance
itself will be aﬀected by transaction characteristics as well as embeddedness
characteristics (see Figure 1). We distinguish between two aspects of con-
tractual governance: the eﬀort invested in contracting and the content of the
contract, more precisely, an indicator of the completeness of the contract
(a complete contract would cover explicitly and unambiguously all contin-
gencies that might arise during and after the transaction; see, e.g., Hart,
1987). We assume that more eﬀort invested in contracting as well as less
incompleteness of the contract reduce problems due to external contingen-
cies, reduce coordination problems while executing the transaction, and
reduce the supplier’s incentives for opportunistic behavior. We thus assume
that more contractual planning aﬀects ex post problems in the focal trans-
action. More speciﬁcally, this yields two additional hypotheses.
Hypothesis 7: Eﬀort invested in contracting will be negatively related to the
occurrence of ex post problems.
Hypothesis 8: Completeness of the contract will be negatively related to the
occurrence of ex post problems.
3. Methods
3.1. DATA AND SAMPLE
We test our hypotheses using survey data on the purchase of IT by Dutch
small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) with 5–200 employees (see
Batenburg, 1997a; b; Batenburg and Van de Rijt, 1998 for detailed infor-
mation on the data). The survey was conducted in two periods. Two samples
of IT-transactions have been collected in 1995. An additional sample was
collected in 1998. This resulted in a data set with detailed information on
1252 IT-transactions. The data set was not collected exclusively for testing
hypotheses on the occurrence of ex post problems. Rather, the aim was to
collect a multi-purpose data set for testing hypotheses on how transaction
characteristics, embeddedness, and other variables aﬀect ex ante governance
of transactions such as supplier selection (e.g., Buskens et al., 2003) and
contractual governance (e.g., Batenburg et al., 2003; Buskens, 2002), as well
as ex post governance, including conﬂict resolution (e.g., Rooks and Snijders,
2001).
At the time of data collection, the purchase of IT oﬀered a suitable
context and strategic research site for testing hypotheses on ex post
problems. IT was rapidly developing. Rapid improvement of hardware
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performance and software applications induced considerable uncertainties
with respect to price and quality. Also, the market for IT-consultancy and
services was characterized by high rates of ﬁrms going bankrupt as well as
frequent mergers and acquisitions. Thus, the purchase of IT-products and
related services often implied considerable risks associated with speciﬁc
investments and long-term business relations (see, e.g., Schellekens et al.,
2000). Given that IT-transactions often involved sizeable risks, problems
were likely to occur.
One reason for using data on IT-purchases by SMEs was that these buyers
usually lack expertise and resources for the in-house production of IT-
products. This makes some of the simplifying assumptions used in our the-
oretical argument and in our empirical analysis less problematic. Speciﬁcally,
we can more easily neglect the make or buy-decision and assume the trans-
action as exogenously given. This at least reduces a selection bias problem.
For example, the eﬀect of relation speciﬁc investments could be underesti-
mated, because the more risky transactions are managed by vertical inte-
gration (Masten, 1996b: 50). Likewise, embeddedness eﬀects could be
underestimated if buyers tend to avoid risky transactions with suppliers if the
transaction is not well embedded (Buskens, 2002: 156–157). In fact,
according to the answers to one of the questions in the survey, less than 5%
of the transactions involved IT-products that could have been produced
easily by the buyer. Note also that remaining selection bias of the type
sketched should work against our hypotheses.
The sampling frame for the 1995 survey was a business-to-business
database of Dutch SMEs that contained information about the characteris-
tics of these SMEs with respect to automation. The database is known to be
far more up to date and reliable than the often used database of the Chamber
of Industry and Commerce. At the time of data collection, about 80% of all
Dutch SMEs with more than ﬁve employees were included in the database.
The database could be considered to be representative for the Dutch popu-
lation of SMEs (see Batenburg, 1997a). Three criteria were used for strati-
ﬁcation. First, the sample was stratiﬁed according to the number of
IT-specialists employed by the ﬁrm. The second stratiﬁcation criterion was
the strength of inter-ﬁrm relations within certain sectors of industry. Using 21
expert judgements, sectors were divided in three groups: sectors with weak,
medium, and strong inter-ﬁrm relations. The third stratiﬁcation criterion was
the type of IT-products purchased by a ﬁrm. This criterion distinguished four
groups of products: standard hardware, complex hardware, standard soft-
ware, and complex software. The three stratiﬁcation criteria resulted in a
sampling design with 36 (3 3 4) cells.
Key informants of buying ﬁrms were ﬁrst brieﬂy interviewed by a struc-
tured Computer Assisted Telephone Interview (CATI). In the CATI-interview,
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cooperation was asked from an employee responsible for automation in
the ﬁrm. Most of the key informants were IT-managers of the buying ﬁrm.
The CATI-interview was then used to randomly select a particular
IT-investment the ﬁrm had made in the recent past, in order to deﬁne
beforehand on which transaction the main questionnaire would focus.
Usually, the respondents were involved themselves with and often responsible
for the purchase.
Following this sampling procedure, a main sample of 547 IT-transac-
tions was obtained. Subsequently, the data set was extended with an
additional sample. This additional sample was collected in order to obtain
more observations on innovative and complex IT-products. Transactions
were sampled from SMEs in sectors that typically use such products.
Using judgements of IT-market researchers and ﬁgures from Statistics
Netherlands, ﬁve such sectors were identiﬁed (food industry, metal
industry, transport equipment, wholesale trade, and road transport). The
additional sample was stratiﬁed using only the criterion related to the IT-
specialists in the buyer’s ﬁrm. Complex transactions are assumed to be
associated with more risks. Therefore, we include both samples in our
analyses. Another 241 questionnaires were collected within this additional
sample.
From the main sample and the additional sample, data were obtained
from 788 (547 + 241) IT-buying ﬁrms. About 25% (183 out of 788) of the
respondents were willing to ﬁll out a second questionnaire regarding the
purchase of a diﬀerent IT-product, in most cases from a diﬀerent supplier. In
total, the 1995 data set thus consists of 971 (547 + 241 + 183) transactions,
of which 183 are second transactions from the same buyer. Respondents were
visited by a member of the research team to personally deliver the ques-
tionnaire and eventually assist the respondent in ﬁlling in the questionnaire.
In about 15% (132 out of 788) of the cases, respondents were willing to
participate but did not agree with a visit. Questionnaires were then sent to
them by mail.
The total response rate equaled 59% in 1995 (see Batenburg, 1997b for
details), a high response rate in surveys among organizations (see Kalleberg
et al., 1996: chaps. 1–2) in general and speciﬁcally in survey research on ex
post problems and supplier performance (see the response rates of the studies
discussed in the Introduction above). Non-response analysis that was feasible
through relatively extensive information on the buyer ﬁrms not agreeing to
participate in the survey showed that the response group is not biased on
crucial ﬁrm characteristics such as size, industry, or region. We also know
from a question in the CATI-questionnaire that ﬁrms in our sample do not
diﬀer from the non-response group in their general satisfaction with
IT-suppliers (see Batenburg, 1997b for details).
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To improve data quality on the cases already collected and to collect data
on new transactions, the participating buyer ﬁrms were contacted once again
in 1998, using CATI. With respect to the transactions from the 1995 study,
we wanted to ﬁnd out whether new problems had come up between 1995 and
1998. Also, ﬁrms were asked to participate in a new wave of standard mail
questionnaires on a new IT-purchase. This resulted in an additional set of 281
transactions. The joint data set from the 1995 and 1998 surveys thus contains
information on 1252 (971 + 281) focal transactions from 788 buyers, a
sizeable data set compared to earlier survey research in our ﬁeld.
3.2. MEASUREMENTS
We now describe operationalizations of the theoretical variables. We ﬁrst
consider our dependent variable: the occurrence of ex post problems. Sub-
sequently, we operationalize transaction characteristics, embeddedness vari-
ables, and contractual governance characteristics. We also introduce control
variables. Details on the items used for constructing the variables, including
Cronbach’s a for each set of items, can be found in the Appendix.
3.2.1. Ex post problems
The occurrence of ex post problems is measured using detailed data on
problems that occurred during and after the focal transaction. In the survey,
questions were asked about 11 typical problems that are often associated
with IT-transactions (Riesewijk and Warmerdam, 1988). Respondents could
indicate for each possible problem if it occurred at all and how serious the
problem was. In 72% of the transactions (902 out of 1252) at least one
problem occurred at least to a certain degree. The variable EX POST
PROBLEMS is derived from the scores on the questions about the occur-
rence of problems. EX POST PROBLEMS is constructed in such a way that
a higher value on the variable indicates that more problems occurred and
that problems were more serious. To examine validity, we used additional
data from our survey. Buyers were asked to indicate their satisfaction with
both the supplier and the product by providing a report mark between 1 and
10 (the scale used for report marks in Dutch schools) for the supplier and the
product. Both satisfaction variables correlate strongly and signiﬁcantly with
EX POST PROBLEMS (average correlation coeﬃcient = )0.53; p<0.001).
3.2.2. Transaction-speciﬁc investments
As indicators for transaction-speciﬁc investments, we use four questions on
diﬀerent types of switching costs, i.e., costs for the buyer in case the buyer
would have to switch to another product. This is in line with other commonly
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used measures of speciﬁc investments (David and Han, 2004: 49). To check
the validity of the measurement, we correlated SWITCHING COSTS with a
survey variable measuring the subjectively experienced dependence of the
buyer on the supplier. We ﬁnd a positive and signiﬁcant correlation between
the variables, although the correlation is not particularly high (r = 0.26,
p<0.001).
3.2.3. Behavioral uncertainty
We use a variable MONITORING PROBLEMS as an indicator for
behavioral uncertainty (see David and Han, 2004 for similar measures of
uncertainty). The variable is measured using four questions that tap into the
buyer’s diﬃculties to assess the quality of the product at the time of delivery,
to compare tenders, to compare the product with alternative products, and to
compare the price-quality relation of potential suppliers.
3.2.4. Dyadic embeddedness
The survey included a question whether there were previous transactions of
the buyer with the same supplier. 52% of the transactions (654 out of 1252)
were transactions such that the buyer had done business previously with the
supplier. For these cases, buyers were subsequently asked about satisfaction
with those previous transactions. This indicator is used to construct a dummy
variable SATISFACTION, indicating whether the buyer was satisﬁed or less
than satisﬁed with previous business with the supplier (1 = satisﬁed with
previous business). Thus, following Granovetter (1985: 486), our measure
accounts for the content and history of the relation. A problem for the test of
Hypothesis 3 is that our variable SATISFACTION is meaningful only when
a common past with the supplier exists. In the analysis, we account for this
problem by constructing a new variable SATISFACTION* that results from
multiplying SATISFACTION with PAST, a dummy variable measuring
whether or not previous business exists (1 = previous business exists).
Hence, SATISFACTION* equals zero when there were no previous trans-
actions between buyer and supplier and is equal to the value of the original
variable SATISFACTION otherwise. Formally, SATISFACTION* can be
interpreted as an interaction variable SATISFACTIONPAST.
Our questionnaire included a question if the buyer expected, before the
focal transaction was executed, future transactions with the supplier.
Respondents could choose between ﬁve response categories (ranging from
‘‘no expectation of future transactions’’ to ‘‘very regular and/or very sizeable
future transactions were expected’’). We use the score of the buyer on this
question for the construction of the variable EXPECTED FUTURE. Note
that the measurement of this variable is not without problems (see Buskens,
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2002: 135–136; Batenburg et al., 2003: 168). The respondent had to recall an
expectation, often from a number of years ago (an average transaction took
place around 1992 for the 1995 sample and around 1996/7 for the 1998
sample). The accuracy of answers to such retrospective questions on attitudes
rather than behavior is likely to be doubtful (Bernard et al., 1985). However,
no better measurement is available and we thus use this variable in our
analyses.
3.2.5. Network embeddedness
The voice network refers to the buyer’s opportunities for collecting and
circulating information about the supplier. We employ three indicators for
the voice network, one ‘‘local’’ and two ‘‘global’’ network characteristics
(see Buskens, 2002: chaps. 2 and 5 for a detailed discussion). The local
indicator is a characteristic of the ego-centered network of the buyer,
namely, the degree of the buyer in the sense of the number of other buyers
of the supplier whom the buyer in the focal transaction knows. The
questionnaire includes a question directly measuring the number of those
other buyers. The variable DEGREE is based on that question. Second, as
a global network characteristic, we use an indicator for the density of
contacts between ﬁrms in the buyer’s sector of industry. This indicator is
based on judgments of 21 experts. The experts provided estimates for 35
sectors on information exchange between the ﬁrms in a sector through
business contacts as well as informal contacts between the ﬁrms. The var-
iable SECTOR DENSITY is based on these judgments. As a third indi-
cator for the voice network, we employ the answer to a survey question on
the visibility of the supplier in the market. The variable VISIBILITY
represents the score of the buyer on this question.
Note that we employ measures from diﬀerent sources as indicators for the
voice network, thus reducing common method variance problems with re-
spect to one of our core variables (Podsakoﬀ et al., 2003: 897–898; Podsakoﬀ
and Organ, 1986: 542). Note also that our global network characteristics
SECTOR DENSITY and VISIBILITY indicate a supplier’s ‘‘generalized
reputation’’ (Uzzi, 1996: 680) rather than more ‘‘ﬁne-grained information
transfer’’ (Uzzi, 1997: 45–46) between two buyers of the same supplier that is
captured by our DEGREE variable. One might thus conjecture that the local
network characteristic has a stronger eﬀect on the occurrence of ex post
problems.
The buyer’s exit network depends on the buyer’s opportunities to pur-
chase a similar product or service from an alternative supplier. The ques-
tionnaire comprised two questions that can be used as indicators for the exit
network, namely, a question about the number of potential suppliers for
the product and a question about the number of alternative products. The
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variable EXIT NETWORK is constructed as the mean value of the two
scores on these questions.
3.2.6. Contractual governance
Eﬀort invested in contractual governance of the focal transaction is measured
as the natural logarithm of the number of person-days invested in negotiating
with the supplier and designing, drafting, and signing an agreement. The
estimate provided by the respondent is used as the variable EFFORT.
The questionnaire contained a list of 24 legal and ﬁnancial items that can
be arranged in contracts for IT-transactions. These items were chosen in
consultation with specialized lawyers and IT-experts. The list covers typical
issues addressed in contracts for IT-transactions. Respondents provided
information on whether each item was arranged in a written contract, only
verbally, or not at all. The variable COMPLETENESS is constructed as the
sum of the scores on the 24 contract items.
3.2.7. Control variables
To control for confounding eﬀects of product characteristics we included two
dummy variables: a dummy variable TAILOR SOFTWARE indicating
whether the product includes tailor-made software (1 = yes), and a dummy
variable TAILOR HARDWARE indicating whether the product includes
tailor-made hardware (1 = yes). Our data set contains a relatively small
number of transactions involving tailor-made hardware (n = 30) but a rel-
atively high number of transactions involving tailor-made software
(n = 398). To control for the volume of the transaction, we include the
ﬁnancial VOLUME of the transaction. To control for possible eﬀects of the
size of the two ﬁrms involved in the transaction, we include two size-variables
in our analyses, SIZE BUYER and SIZE SUPPLIER. Since data collection
took place in 1995 and in 1998, we also control for possible period eﬀects,
using a dummy variable PERIOD (1 = data collected in 1998). Table I
provides an overview of our variables, including bivariate correlations.
Our dependent variable and most of our independent variables are based
on responses obtained from a key respondent (an important exception being
our variables representing the voice network). Therefore, a common method
variance problem may be suspected to arise. To address this problem, we
carried out a series of Harman’s single-factor tests (see Podsakoﬀ et al., 2003:
889 for a discussion of this approach and its limitations). We thus explored
whether a single factor emerges from a factor analysis or one general factor
accounting for most of the covariance among our measures. First, we
included all the variables measured by means of key respondents’ self-reports
into a factor analysis. No general factor was apparent in the unrotated factor
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structure. Next, we restricted the factor analysis to variables like MONI-
TORING PROBLEMS that are based on more subjective cognitions,
excluding more objective variables like VOLUME, assuming that self-report
bias such as due to a consistency motif would increase the likelihood of a
general factor emerging in an analysis on this reduced set of variables. Again,
we found no general factor in the unrotated factor structure. While this is no
ﬁnal proof that our measures are free of common method variance, we at




Statistical analyses are hampered because the two variables representing
contractual governance of a transaction, EFFORT and COMPLETENESS,
are expected not only to aﬀect our dependent variable EX POST PROB-
LEMS, but are also expected to be themselves aﬀected by transaction
characteristics and embeddedness. Hence, EFFORT and COMPLETENESS
are endogenous variables. This may cause statistical problems because eﬀects
of transaction characteristics and embeddedness on the occurrence of ex post
problems cannot be separated from eﬀects of contractual governance. Fur-
thermore, the variables representing contractual governance and the error
terms covary, thus violating a basic assumption of the classical regression
model. As a consequence, least squares estimators of eﬀects of contractual
governance are inconsistent (Greene, 1997: 288, 738; see Masten, 1996b for a
general discussion of such problems in empirical applications and tests of
transaction cost theory). We attempt to solve these problems by employing
an instrumental variables approach (Greene, 1997: 288–295, 738–759). A
variable can serve as an instrument if the variable correlates with contractual
governance, while not correlating with the occurrence of ex post problems
(see, for example, Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1991: chap. 7). We searched for
instrumental variables by focusing on indicators from our survey for the
buyer’s marginal costs of contractual governance of a transaction. Such
variables can be expected to have a direct eﬀect on EFFORT and COM-
PLETENESS, while one would not expect a direct eﬀect on EX POST
PROBLEMS. We found three variables that satisfy the requirements to serve
as an instrumental variable. First, we use a dummy variable that indicates
whether the contract has been designed primarily by the buyer or by the
supplier (CONTRACT SUPPLIER). If the supplier provided the contract,
less eﬀort for contractual governance is required from the buyer. A second
dummy variable indicates whether the buyer ﬁrm has an in-house legal
department (LEGAL DEPARTMENT). Finally, we use a dummy variable
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indicating whether the buyer ﬁrm has employees with speciﬁc legal expertise
(LEGAL EXPERTISE). The size of the tetrachoric correlations between the
instruments is very small or moderate (between 0.00 and 0.36), indicating
distinct measurements.
For estimation, we employ a simultaneous equation estimation using a
three-stage least squares method (Greene, 1997). This method uses instru-
mental variables to produce consistent estimates and generalized least
squares to account for correlation in the disturbances across equations. In the
ﬁrst stage of this procedure, a regression equation is estimated with the
variables representing contractual governance as dependent variables and
independent variables that include our instrumental variables as well as
transaction characteristics and embeddedness characteristics. In the second
stage, a consistent estimate of the covariance matrix of the equation distur-
bances is produced. Estimates are obtained from the residuals produced from
a two-stage least squares estimation of each structural equation. In stage 3,
the covariance matrix of stage 2 and the predicted values of stage 1 are then
used in the regression of the occurrence of ex post problems.
It is important to note the nested structure of our data. Some buyers are
included in the sample with more than one transaction. Also, some suppliers
are involved in more than one transaction. A multilevel analysis with
transactions nested in buyers reveals a sizeable proportion of the total var-
iance on the level of the buyer. For the suppliers, multilevel analysis reveals
no evidence for clustering of the data. We checked whether this nested
structure of the data aﬀects results by comparing the results of our three-
stage least squares estimation with the results of a two-stage least squares
estimation. Two-stage least squares estimation does not include stage 2 of the
three-stage least squares procedure and is less eﬃcient (Greene, 1997), but the
Stata implementation (StataCorp, 2003) allows for a robust estimator of
variance (Huber, 1967; Rogers, 1993). The results of the two-stage least
squares estimation do not diﬀer substantially from the three-stage least
squares results.
4.2. HYPOTHESES TESTING
Table II presents the results of the three-stage least squares regression
analysis. Two models are presented. Model 1 includes all variables, except for
the interaction variable SATISFACTION*, which is included in Model 2. In
the remainder of this section we successively discuss the results concerning
eﬀects of transaction characteristics, embeddedness, and contractual gover-
nance. We then present exploratory analyses comparing the strength of the
eﬀects of diﬀerent kinds of variables and brieﬂy discuss the eﬀects of control
variables as well as the results of regression diagnostics.
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4.2.1. Transaction characteristics
In both models, the variable SWITCHING COSTS has a positive and
signiﬁcant eﬀect on EX POST PROBLEMS. Hence, the results support
Hypothesis 1. Hypothesis 2 states that monitoring problems will be
positively related to the occurrence of ex post problems. Our data
support this hypothesis: the variable MONITORING PROBLEMS has
a highly signiﬁcant and substantial positive eﬀect on EX POST
PROBLEMS.
Table II. Three-stage least squares regression analysis of EX POST PROBLEMS (1205
transactions of 775 buyers)
Variable Hypothesis Model 1 Model 2
Transaction characteristics
SWITCHING COSTS + 0.110* (0.066) 0.090 (0.060)
MONITORING PROBLEMS + 0.275*** (0.041) 0.263*** (0.042)
Embeddedness characteristics
PAST ? )0.042 (0.033) )0.045 (0.033)
SATISFACTION* – )0.206*** (0.038)
EXPECTED FUTURE – 0.054 (0.031) 0.066* (0.032)
DEGREE – )0.063* (0.035) )0.059* (0.035)
SECTOR DENSITY – )0.068** (0.029) )0.055* (0.029)
VISIBILITY – )0.052* (0.028) )0.054* (0.028)
EXIT NETWORK – )0.088** (0.034) )0.085** (0.034)
Contractual governance
EFFORT – )0.007 (0.197) )0.060 (0.196)
COMPLETENESS – 0.083 (0.286) 0.178 (0.289)
Control variables
TAILOR SOFTWARE ? 0.188*** (0.043) 0.178*** (0.043)
TAILOR HARDWARE ? 0.013 (0.035) 0.009 (0.035)
VOLUME ? 0.034 (0.074) 0.051 (0.073)
SIZE BUYER ? 0.062 (0.034) 0.065 (0.034)
SIZE SUPPLIER ? )0.039 (0.049) )0.058 (0.050)
PERIOD ? 0.078** (0.030) 0.069* (0.030)
CONSTANT )0.007 )0.013
R2 0.259 0.263
***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05; p<.10; one-tailed tests. Standard errors between paren-
theses. All variables except the instrumented variables are standardized. R2 is mentioned for
completeness, though the measure has no statistical meaning in three-stage least squares
regression (Sribney et al., 2003).
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4.2.2. Dyadic embeddedness
Our results for Model 2 clearly support Hypothesis 3: the more successful – in
the sense of buyer satisfaction – previous transactions of the buyer with the
supplier from the focal transaction have been, the less ex post problems occur
in the focal transaction.
The variable EXPECTED FUTURE has no signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on
EX POST PROBLEMS. The eﬀect of EXPECTED FUTURE is even sig-
niﬁcantly positive, thus refuting Hypothesis 4. A possible explanation could
be as follows. As described in the measurement section, our variable EX-
PECTED FUTURE is based on the buyer’s expectation of future business
with the supplier. It is conceivable that the buyer expects future business with
the supplier because of one-sided dependency of the buyer on the supplier. As
has been argued above, such unilateral dependency provides incentives for
opportunistic behavior of the supplier and would thus increase the occur-
rence of ex post problems (Provan and Skinner, 1989). We can test this using
a subjective assessment of the one-sided dependency of the buyer that was
included as a question in the questionnaire. When including this measure of
unilateral dependence in the regression model (analysis not reported here) the
absolute size of the coeﬃcient of EXPECTED FUTURE indeed drops sig-
niﬁcantly (we calculated the signiﬁcance using the Stata module suest, see
Weesie, 1999). We can also test our explanation for the refutation of
Hypothesis 4 by eliminating the variables SWITCHING COSTS and EXIT
NETWORK in the regression equation. Since these two variables likewise
indicate unilateral dependence, we would expect that the absolute size of the
coeﬃcient of EXPECTED FUTURE would increase. We do indeed ﬁnd such
an increase (analysis not reported here). It thus seems that our EXPECTED
FUTURE variable is not a valid measure of the buyer’s opportunities for
future rewards of good performance of the supplier while executing the focal
transaction and for negative sanctions of current bad performance of the
supplier.
4.2.3. Network embeddedness
We ﬁnd quite some support for our hypotheses on negative eﬀects of network
embeddedness on the occurrence of ex post problems. First, consider the
eﬀects of the voice network. The eﬀect of DEGREE is negative and signiﬁ-
cant: the more other buyers of the supplier our focal buyer knows, the less ex
post problems the buyer experiences. The eﬀect of SECTOR DENSITY is
likewise negative and signiﬁcant: more information exchange between ﬁrms
in the industry sector of the buyer is related to less ex post problems. Finally,
the eﬀect of VISIBILITY is negative and signiﬁcant: the more visible the
supplier is in the market, the less ex post problems the buyer experiences.
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Using the Stata implementation of Wald tests for simple and composite
linear hypotheses reveals that the eﬀects of the variables DEGREE, SEC-
TOR DENSITY, and VISIBILITY simultaneously diﬀer from zero with a
high signiﬁcance level (p<0.005). Our results are robust in the sense that
they do not depend on whether we employ measures based on reports from
key respondents in our survey or independent measures based on expert
judgments. Hence, our results consistently support Hypothesis 5. Note also
that a Wald test provides no support for the conjecture that DEGREE as a
ﬁne-grained measure of information transfer has a stronger eﬀect on EX
POST PROBLEMS than the variables SECTOR DENSITY or VISIBILITY
that indicate generalized reputation.
We ﬁnd similar results for the eﬀect of the exit network. The eﬀect of
EXIT NETWORK is negative and signiﬁcant: the more alternative suppliers
or alternative products for the buyer, the less ex post problems occur.
Hypothesis 6 is thus supported by our data as well.
4.2.4. Contractual governance
Perhaps surprisingly, our results reveal no relationship between contractual
governance and the occurrence of ex post problems in the sense that neither
EFFORT nor COMPLETENESS has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on EX POST
PROBLEMS. Hence, Hypotheses 7 and 8 are not supported. Of course, one
could imagine that other features of contractual governance do aﬀect the
occurrence of ex post problems. Our data set comprises additional infor-
mation on contractual governance. We were therefore able to explore this
issue in some directions. First, our questionnaire elicited information on
whether legal and ﬁnancial issues associated with the transaction were
arranged at all and, if so, only verbally or in a written contract. We could
thus also check for eﬀects of contracts that are more explicit in the sense that
legal and ﬁnancial issues are arranged in writing. Again, in various analyses
we could not ﬁnd an eﬀect on the occurrence of ex post problems. Second, we
know how much attention was drawn to each legal and ﬁnancial issue during
negotiations. Employing weights for legal and ﬁnancial issues that account
for the amount of attention does not aﬀect our results. Finally, one could
imagine that the kind of contract used would explain the absence of eﬀects of
contractual governance. More precisely, one could argue that if a standard
contract is used, the number of clauses does not necessary reﬂect the quality
of contractual governance (see Macaulay, 1963). To control for this, we
included in the regression model in analyses not reported here an interaction
of COMPLETENESS with a dummy variable indicating whether the con-
tract was tailor-made or standard. However, this interaction is far from
signiﬁcant.
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4.3. ADDITIONAL ANALYSES
4.3.1. A comparative analysis of the strength of eﬀects of embeddedness
characteristics and contractual planning
Our hypotheses predict the sign of the eﬀects of diﬀerent variables on EX
POST PROBLEMS rather than the strength of those eﬀects. An exploratory
analysis of eﬀect strengths is revealing, though. Speciﬁcally, such an analysis
can contribute to a comparative assessment of contractual governance on the
one hand and non-contractual governance that becomes feasible through
embeddedness on the other.
While all other variables in Table II, including the dependent variable, are
standardized, the instrumented variables are themselves not standardized.
This complicates the comparison of the size of coeﬃcients. To account for
this complication, we carried out additional analyses. First, we performed an
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis of our contractual planning
variables on the instruments and all the exogenous variables. We then
standardized the predicted instrumented variables and used them with all
other standardized exogenous variables in an OLS regression of the stan-
dardized variable EX POST PROBLEMS. This yields a standardized solu-
tion allowing for a comparison of the size of coeﬃcients. The results of this
procedure do not diﬀer from the results based on the analysis in Table II.
First, it is useful to note that the eﬀect of SATISFACTION* on EX POST
PROBLEMS is in the same order as the eﬀect of MONITORING PROB-
LEMS and larger than the eﬀect of SWITCHING COSTS. It is thus not the
case that the eﬀects of transaction characteristics are generally larger than
embeddedness eﬀects. Second, a Wald test reveals that the combined eﬀect of
the variables representing network embeddedness does not diﬀer signiﬁcantly
from the eﬀect of SATISFACTION*. This does not support conjectures
sometimes found in the literature that dyadic embeddedness eﬀects will
outperform eﬀects of network eﬀects, for example, because ﬁrst-hand
information from dyadic embeddedness is more reliable than third-party
information one receives through networks (see Lorenz, 1988; Raub and
Weesie, 1990; Williamson, 1996: 153–155; Buskens, 2002: 18–20 for more
detailed discussions). Finally, consider a comparative assessment of the
eﬀects of contractual and non-contractual governance through embedded-
ness. Table II shows that contractual governance has no eﬀect on EX POST
PROBLEMS. SATISFACTION* as well as network embeddedness char-
acteristics reduce the occurrence of ex post problems. On the other hand,
expected future business is associated with more ex post problems. The eﬀect
of EXPECTED FUTURE is, however, more than outweighed by the eﬀects
of the other embeddedness variables. A Wald test shows that the combined
eﬀect of the embeddedness variables on EX POST PROBLEMS is clearly
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negative, with a high signiﬁcance level (p<0.0001). In this sense, non-con-
tractual governance based on embeddedness outperforms contractual
governance when it comes to the prevention of ex post problems.
4.3.2. Control variables
Our results show that the occurrence of ex post problems decreases for tailor-
made software, while tailor-made hardware has no such eﬀect. Transaction
volume also has no signiﬁcant eﬀect. While the size of the supplier has no
signiﬁcant eﬀect, the size of the buyer has a signiﬁcantly positive eﬀect on EX
POST PROBLEMS. The period in which the survey was conducted also has
a signiﬁcant eﬀect: compared to 1995, more ex post problems occur on
average in transactions on which data have been collected in 1998.
4.3.3. Regression diagnostics
We controlled for interaction eﬀects between our independent variables, for
eﬀects of heteroscedasticity, for multicollinearity, and for outlier eﬀects. An
exploratory control for interaction eﬀects shows hardly any signiﬁcant
eﬀects, while our main eﬀects remain robust. Heteroscedasticity means that
residuals diﬀer in their variance, hampering the estimation of standard
errors. Using White’s test reveals indeed heteroscedasticity. Employing
Szroeter’s (1978) Q-statistic, we ﬁnd that mainly transaction characteristics
induce heteroscedasticity. We modeled heteroscedasticity and found hardly
any diﬀerences with the results from the three-stage least squares regression.
Inspection of the bivariate correlations between the independent variables
and of the (co)variance matrix of the estimated coeﬃcients does not reveal
serious problems of multicollinearity. Finally, outlier analyses reveal
approximately 50 observations with a relatively large standardized residual.
Deleting these cases from the analyses does not produce relevant diﬀerences
in our results.
5. Discussion and conclusion
In this paper, we studied ex post features of the governance of inter-ﬁrm
relations. Speciﬁcally, we studied the occurrence of ex post problems in
buyer–supplier transactions. Using transaction cost theory and theory on
embeddedness eﬀects in economic exchange, we focused on eﬀects of trans-
action characteristics, on eﬀects of dyadic as well as network embeddedness
of exchange, and on eﬀects of contractual governance. We tested hypotheses
using a sizeable and rich data set on the purchase of IT-products by Dutch
SMEs. We found evidence for hypothesized eﬀects of transaction charac-
teristics as well as embeddedness. Notably, our data do not support
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hypotheses on eﬀects of contractual governance on the occurrence of ex post
problems. Non-contractual governance based on embeddedness thus seems
to outperform contractual governance as a mechanism of preventing prob-
lems during and after the execution of a transaction.
A distinct contribution of our study is the inclusion of eﬀects of network
embeddedness on ex post problems in the analysis. We distinguished two
types of network embeddedness, namely, the buyer’s network of contacts
with other clients of the supplier (voice network) and the buyer’s network of
(alternative) suppliers (exit network). Our data provide consistent support for
hypotheses on eﬀects of network embeddedness.
Several suggestions for future research emerge from our results. Obvi-
ously, the lack of eﬀects of various variables representing contractual gov-
ernance merits attention. Puzzling evidence of the type reported here, namely,
that quite some characteristics of contractual governance do not aﬀect the
occurrence of ex post problems, could inspire analyses that proceed from
assumptions on various mechanisms how contractual governance can
undermine ‘‘informal’’ bases of supplier performance such as ‘‘trust’’ (see,
e.g., Malhotra and Murnighan, 2002 for work in this direction). An open
question is then, of course, why ﬁrms engage in costly contractual gover-
nance, seemingly not anticipating on the lack of eﬀects on the occurrence of
ex post problems. Another approach would be to focus on substitution eﬀects
versus complementarities between contractual governance on the one hand
and non-contractual, relational governance based on dyadic and network
embeddedness on the other hand (see, e.g., Poppo and Zenger, 2002 for work
in this direction).
A further problem for future research is related to eﬀects of dyadic
embeddedness and derives from the lack of empirical support for the
hypothesis that expected future transactions should reduce the occurrence of
ex post problems. We found some evidence that this result could be due to
measurement problems. First, one would be interested in improved mea-
surements that circumvent the problem of asking retrospective questions on
expected future business. This presumably calls for prospective research
designs that are, unfortunately, not easy to implement in empirical research
on inter-ﬁrm relations. Second, one would be interested in measurements that
allow to disentangle expectations of future business that result from one-
sided dependence of the buyer on the supplier from expectations of future
business that are (more) conditional on the suppliers present behavior and
performance, since the prediction of negative eﬀects of expected future
business on the occurrence of ex post problems is based on the latter type of
expectations.
Our results on eﬀects of network embeddedness may also encourage more
detailed studies. For example, while the eﬀect of being embedded in an exit
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network can be plausibly interpreted as a control eﬀect of embeddedness, the
eﬀect of being embedded in a voice network can be interpreted as a learning
eﬀect as well as a control eﬀect of embeddedness. It would thus be useful to
develop and implement research designs that allow to disentangle learning
and control eﬀects (see Buskens and Raub, 2002 for such designs).
Finally, a major practical implication for purchase management follows
from our ﬁndings on eﬀects of embeddedness and speciﬁcally of network
embeddedness on the occurrence of ex post problems. Typically, advice on
purchase management and common benchmarking practices focus on
transaction and supplier characteristics and aim at legal features of con-
tractual governance (Leenders and Fearon, 1993). Empirically, this is
reﬂected in strong opinions of purchasing professionals. They feel (see
Tazelaar and Snijders, 2004 for a study of purchasing experts’ predictions on
the occurrence of ex post problems in IT-transactions) that the degree of
detail of the written contract is one of the most important predictors for the
occurrence of ex post problems. Conversely, purchasing professionals believe
that characteristics related to network embeddedness such as the supplier’s
reputation (which is similar to our VISIBILITY variable) is only moderately
important for predicting ex post problems, while they feel that knowing other
clients of the supplier (in fact, this is our variable DEGREE) is one of the
least important predictors of ex post problems. Our ﬁndings suggest, how-
ever, that buyers aiming at optimizing their purchase management should
take network embeddedness explicitly into account, anticipating on the
eﬀects of network embeddedness on the occurrence of ex post problems.
More than before they should recognize that enhancing own network
embeddedness through contacts with other ﬁrms as well as accumulating
knowledge about the supplier’s network and the supplier’s current and past
performance within this network in an earlier stage of search and selection
can help economizing on costly contractual governance and can help
reducing ex post problems.
Given that network embeddedness seems to reduce ex post problems, it
follows that buyers have an incentive to take their network embeddedness
not as given but to actively invest in such network embeddedness. This would
imply that embeddedness is no longer conceptualized as exogenous but that
embeddedness characteristics are conceived as endogenous variables. Con-
ceptualizing network embeddedness as social capital, Flap (2004) oﬀers a
theoretical perspective that combines the idea of networks providing returns
to actors with a focus on how actors invest in such networks. Dutta and
Jackson (2003) provide a sample of the rapidly expanding literature on for-
mal models of strategic network formation that can be used to endogenize
embeddedness. Finally, Snijders (2001) develops statistical models for the
analysis of network dynamics that nicely correspond to the basic idea that
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network dynamics result from instrumental behavior of actors who invest in
their embeddedness.
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Appendix: Variable Construction
In the following, ‘‘product’’ refers to the focal transaction.
EX POST PROBLEMS (11-item measure): Original questions: These are
possible problems associated with purchasing such products and with service.
To what degree did you experience each of these problems? Delivery delay –
exceeding of price/budget – product incomplete – product too slow/limited –
deviation from agreed upon speciﬁcations – incompatibility with other
IT-products – installation too quick/careless – insuﬃcient support – service
too slow/too late – updates too slow/too late – documentation incomplete/
unclear. Answer categories per item (5-point scale): problem did not occur at
all (=1) – hardly (=2) – to a certain degree (=3) – to a high degree (=4) – to
a very high degree (=5). Variable construction: EX POST PROBLEMS is the
sum of the 11 items on problems. Cronbach’s a = .90. Note: Using factor
scores for constructing an alternative EX POST PROBLEMS-variable does
not aﬀect our results (analyses not reported here). Both constructs correlate
highly (r = 0.998).
SWITCHING COSTS (4-item measure): Original questions [variable
construction label]: Assume that the product had failed to function and had
had to be replaced. What would have been the damage, in terms of time and
money, associated with: purchasing another product [new product] – training
of personnel [training] – new data entry [data entry] – idle production [idle
production]. Answer categories per item (5-point scale): minimal (=1) – small
(=2) – moderate (=3) – large (=4) – very large (=5). Variable construction:
SWITCHING COSTS is the main principal component of the 4 items
mentioned (eigenvalue ﬁrst component 2.38, second component 0.67).
SWITCHING COSTS = .52[new product] + .52[training] + .50[data
entry] + .45[idle production]. Cronbach’s a = 0.77.
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MONITORING PROBLEMS (4-item measure): Original questions [var-
iable construction label]: Was it diﬃcult for you and your employees to judge
the quality of the product at the time of delivery? [quality] – Was it diﬃcult
for your ﬁrm to compare tenders? [tenders] – Was it diﬃcult for your ﬁrm to
compare the product with other products? [other products] – Was it diﬃcult
for your ﬁrm to compare the price-quality relation of potential suppliers?
[price-quality]. Answer categories per item (5-point scale): very easy (=1) –
easy (=2) – somewhat diﬃcult (=3) – diﬃcult (=4) – very diﬃcult (=5).
Variable construction: MONITORING PROBLEMS is the main principal
component of the 4 items mentioned (eigenvalue ﬁrst component 2.02, sec-
ond component 0.53). MONITORING PROBLEMS = .41[qual-
ity] + .51[tenders] + .54[other products] + .53[price-quality]. Cronbach’s
a = 0.83.
PAST (single-item measure): Original question: Has your ﬁrm had any
kind of business relation with this supplier before the purchase of this
product? Answer categories: no (=0) – yes (=1). Variable construction:
PAST is a dummy variable using the score on this question.
SATISFACTION (single-item measure): Original question: How satisﬁed
was your ﬁrm with previous business with the supplier? Answer categories (5-
point scale): very unsatisﬁed – unsatisﬁed – moderately satisﬁed – satisﬁed –
very satisﬁed. Variable construction: SATISFACTION is a dummy variable
with 1 = satisﬁed or very satisﬁed, and 0 = very unsatisﬁed, unsatisﬁed, or
moderately satisﬁed. Note: We constructed a dummy variable because the
distribution of the answers is bimodal.
EXPECTED FUTURE (single-item measure): Original question: To
what extent did you expect, before the purchase of this product, that your
ﬁrm would continue business with this supplier? Answer categories (5-point
scale): no business (=1) – incidental business of limited size (=2) – some
business of limited size (=3) – regular and/or extensive business (=4) –
very regular and/or very extensive business (=5). Variable construction:
EXPECTED FUTURE is the score of the chosen answer category.
DEGREE (single-item measure): Original question: Please think about
other ﬁrms that have (likely) been clients of the supplier at the time of the
purchase of the product. How many of such ﬁrms did you know? Open
answer category: number of ﬁrms. Variable construction:
DEGREE = number of ﬁrms mentioned by respondent (with a maximum of
7 to account for outlier-eﬀects).
SECTOR DENSITY: This variable is based on judgments of 21 experts
(see Rooks, 2002: 139–142 for a detailed discussion). These experts provided
estimates for 35 sectors of industry with respect to contacts and information
exchange between ﬁrms in the respective sector. Sectors were deﬁned
employing the classiﬁcation used by Statistics Netherlands. The experts were
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asked to consider business contacts as well as informal contacts. They were
also asked to consider the number of contacts as well as the frequency,
intensity, and reliability of information exchange through these contacts.
Based on these expert judgments, we distinguish three categories with respect
to SECTOR DENSITY: weak (=1) – medium (=2) – strong (=3).
VISIBILITY (single-item measure): Original question: How visible was
the supplier in the market before the purchase of the product? Consider
visibility through the media, through fairs, as well as through business
with other ﬁrms you are in contact with or through business with your
own clients. Answer categories (5-point scale): not at all visible (=1) –
hardly visible (=2) – reasonably visible (=3) – visible (=4) – very visible
(=5). Variable construction: VISIBILITY is the score of the chosen
answer category.
EXIT NETWORK (2-item measure): Original questions: Considering the
situation before purchasing the product, how large was the number of
potential suppliers? – Considering the situation before purchasing the
product, how large was the number of alternatives for the product? Answer
categories per item (5-point scale): minimal (=1) – small (=2) – reasonable
(=3) – large (=4) – very large (=5). Variable construction: EXIT NET-
WORK is the mean value of the scores on the two questions. Correlation
between the scores: r = 0.58, p<0.001. Cronbach’s a = .74.
EFFORT (single-item measure): Original question: How much time did
you and your colleagues spend): on writing down the agreement and on the
negotiations with the supplier of this product? Open answer category: number
of person-days. Variable construction: EFFORT = natural logarithm of the
number of person-days mentioned by respondent.
COMPLETENESS (24-item measure): Original questions. For each of the
following ﬁnancial and legal clauses, can you indicate how they were
arranged? Price determination – price level – price changes – payment terms –
sanctions on late payment – delivery time – liability supplier – force majeure –
warranties supplier – quality (norms) – intellectual property (escrow) – piracy
protection – restrictions on product use – non-disclosure – insurance supplier
– duration service – reservation spare-parts – duration maintenance –
updating – arbitration – calculation R&D costs – joint management during
transaction – technical speciﬁcations – termination. Answer categories per
item (3-point scale): not arranged at all (=0) – only verbally arranged (=1) –
written arrangement (=2). Variable construction: COMPLETE-
NESS = sum of the scores on the 24 items. A non-parametric item response
analysis for polytomous items (Mokken analysis) reveals that the contract
items together form one scale. None of the items has a Loevinger’s H smaller
than 0.30 and the overall scale coeﬃcient equals 0.51, which is indicative of a
strong scale (see Mokken, 1970).
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TAILOR SOFTWARE (3-item measure): The questionnaire included
questions on what the product included. Among other things, the respondent
was asked if the product included adjusted software and/or tailor made
software and/or industry-speciﬁc software. TAILOR SOFTWARE is a
dummy variable with 1 = product includes adjusted software and/or tailor
made software and/or industry-speciﬁc software and 0 = otherwise.
TAILOR HARDWARE (4-item measure): The respondent was likewise
asked if the product included the design of hardware. TAILOR HARD-
WARE is a dummy variable with 1 = product includes design of hardware
and TAILOR SOFTWARE = 0, while TAILOR HARDWARE = 0
otherwise.
VOLUME (single-item measure): Original question: How much was paid
to the supplier, not including later supplements? Answer categories (5-point
scale): up to 10,000 US$ (midpoint = 0.125) – 10,000–20,000 US$ (mid-
point = 0.375) – 20,000–50,000 US$ (midpoint = 0.75) – 50,000–100,000
US$ (midpoint = 1.5) – more than 100,000 US$ (midpoint = 3.5). Variable
construction: VOLUME is the midpoint of the chosen answer category, with
midpoints of the price classes expressed in NLG (1 US$ = 2.5 NLG at the
time of data collection) divided by 100,000 and using an estimate for the
highest category that does not have an upperbound.
SIZE BUYER (single-item measure): Original question: How many full-
time employees were working at your ﬁrm at the time of the purchase of this
product? Open answer category: number of full-time employees. Variable
construction:SIZEBUYER = natural logarithmof the score on this question.
SIZE SUPPLIER (single-item measure): Original question: How many
employees were working at the supplier at the time of the purchase of this
product? Answer categories (5-point scale): less than 5 (=1) – 5–9 (=2) – 10–
19 (=3) – 20–49 (=4) – 50 or more (=5). Variable construction: SIZE
SUPPLIER is the score of the chosen answer category.
PERIOD: Dummy variable with 0 = data collected in 1995 and 1 = data
collected in 1998.
CONTRACT SUPPLIER: Dummy variable with 1 = contract designed
by supplier and 0 = otherwise.
LEGAL DEPARTMENT: Dummy variable with 1 = buyer has an in-
house legal department and 0 = otherwise.
LEGAL EXPERTISE: Dummy variable with 1 = buyer has employees
with legal expertise and 0 = otherwise.
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